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International law:  The UK Supreme Court’s latest look at its impact on state immunity 
in the UK 
 
Katherine Reece Thomas* 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the recent UK Supreme Court case of US v Nolan concerning the rights 
of a dismissed civilian employee of a US military facility in England. It sets out a summary 
of the court’s findings on European law and ultra vires. It considers the public international 
law aspects of the appeal and asks if the court’s acceptance that a plea of state immunity is 
procedural (and does not therefore affect the state’s underlying duty or obligation) means that 
the UK approach to the relationship between immunity and Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (access to justice) needs to be re-examined. The UK courts 
have hitherto held that Article 6 is not automatically engaged by a plea of immunity on the 
basis that such a plea deprives the court of substantive jurisdiction so there can be no denial 
of access as access does not exist in the first place. The European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg has consistently maintained the opposite view and Nolan may have an impact on 
appeals touching on this issue pending before the Supreme Court. 
Keywords: International law and state immunity; nature of a plea of state immunity; access 
to justice and state immunity; Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights; 2004 
United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property; 
employment rights and immunity.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
It is a rule of customary international law that a state is entitled to plead immunity in the 
courts of another state at the very least in respect of its sovereign activities. It is trite law that 
a state can waive its immunity.  
In The United States of America (Appellant) v Nolan (Respondent), it was 
unsuccessfuly claimed that the USA could  rely on principles of construction under European 
Union or international law to avoid a statutory duty to consult employees made redundant by 
its closure of a military facility in the UK.1 The underlying argument was that  one had to 
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interpret the relevant EU Directive and UK Act and Regulations as inapplicable to the jure 
imperii or sovereign non-commercial activities of foreign states. The interest for international 
lawyers lies in the US attempt to circumvent substantive liability, having failed to plead state 
immunity at the initial Employment Tribunal hearing.2  
The US, not entitled to rely on immunity, was effectively claiming to be exempt from 
liability under the relevant UK employment law. The state argued, in part, that as a matter of 
binding international law, the legislation had to be interpreted as though it did not apply to 
the activities of a foreign state committing a sovereign act overseas, even though those 
activities would otherwise have attracted liability. Lord Mance (giving the only judgment on 
international law3) was not persuaded, finding that such a far reaching exception would 
effectively lead to all legislation being interpreted to exclude foreign state liability where 
state immunity could have been pleaded. The creation of what was, in effect, a second chance 
at state immunity was unwarranted and the appeal was lost on this ground4. 
The decision is important, despite the seemingly thin US arguments, because of the 
Supreme Court’s endorsement of the thesis that state immunity is a procedural plea which is 
distinct from the foreign state’s duty or obligation under English law or the domestic court’s 
underlying jurisdiction. This concept is gaining momentum internationally, was relied upon 
in the seminal International Court of Justice case on immunity, Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State (Germany v Italy), and may have important implications for recent arguments about 
the relationship between immunity and the right of access to a court raised, in particular, by 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.5 This endorsement of immunity as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1
 [2015] UKSC 63 [2015] 3 WLR 1105 (on appeal from The Court of Appeal [2014] EWCA 
Civ 71). The Supreme Court in Nolan decided that the employment law question as a matter 
of English law had to be decided by a further Court of Appeal hearing- as explained in Part II 
below.  
2
 A sovereign state is immune from domestic adjudication except in specific circumstances as 
a matter of international law (the restrictive doctrine). The doctrine is arguably now 
embedded in customary international law and is reflected in the 2004 United Nations 
Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, Annex, UN Doc. 
A/RES/59/38 (not yet in force) much of which represents customary law: Jones v Ministry of 
Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , [2006] UKHL 26 [2007] 1 A.C. 270 paras 8 and 26 
(per Lord Bingham). Once a state has submitted to the jurisdiction in a particular set of 
proceedings it is deemed to have waived immunity. UN Convention Article 8(1) (b).The 
relevant UK provisions are to be found in the UK State Immunity Act 1978 (“SIA”). S 2 of 
SIA deals with waiver and submission. 
3
 The bench was composed of Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and Lord 
Carnwath. 
4
 Nolan,(n.1) para 38. 
5
 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, ICJ Reports (2012) 99 para 57. As discussed below 
in part IV, there is some controversy in international law and English law about the 
jurisprudential nature of a plea of state immunity. If the effect of such a successful plea is to 
remove a state from the court’s jurisdiction altogether then it is said that the right of access to 
a court protected by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights is in doubt (is 
engaged) and the domestic court has to look at whether the plea is proportional and legitimate 
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matter of procedure which has the effect of exempting a state from the jurisdiction rather than 
removing jurisdiction altogether 6 may have ramifications for a number of cases on appeal to 
the Supreme Court and suggests that the approach of the Court of Appeal may need to be 
refined in the Supreme Court.7  
This note will focus on state immunity and jurisdiction and not on the EU or public law 
issues.  
II. Facts and procedural history 
The United States maintains a number of military establishments in the UK and employed 
200 civilian employees at its water repair centre in Hampshire (“the Base”). It decided to 
close the facility in March 2006 and in April told its employees of the planned closure. In 
June all employees were informed that they were at risk of redundancy and the US began 
collective redundancy consultation. Mrs. Nolan, a civilian employee, was made redundant the 
day before the Base was closed. Mrs. Nolan started Employment Tribunal proceedings under 
Part IV Chapter II (which includes sections 188 to 198) of the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 as amended by the Collective Redundancies and Transfer 
of Undertakings (Protection of Employment ) (Amendment ) Regulations 1995 (SI 
1995/2587) (“TULCRA” and the “Regulations”). Mrs. Nolan alleged that TULCRA required 
the US to consult when it took the decision to carry out collective redundancies and not when 
it did consult, which was after the decision had been taken. There being no trade union at the 
Base, her claim was founded on her being an “employee representative” under TULCRA s 
188(IB).8 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
as a matter of European law which will follow customary international law on this. Some UK 
lawyers and judges have preferred the approach which denies that Article 6 is engaged by a 
plea of immunity, meaning that it is a matter of UK law not EU law whether the immunity 
plea is accepted or not, see Lord Millett in Holland v Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 1 WLR 1573, 
1583D-F [2000] 3 All ER 833, 846-47 and  Jones v Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26 [2007] 1 A.C. 270 paras 14 (Lord Binhgam) and para 64 
(Lord Hoffmann). See Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (revised 
and updated 3rd edn) OUP 2015 Part 1 p11, p 20 and chapter IV p 82. See also Andrew 
Sanger, “State Immunity and the Right of Access to a Court under the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights” (2016) ICLQ 213-228 at 219.   
6
 The procedural approach is  also the key to the normative argument that state immunity as a 
rule of international law can exist alongside international rules of jus cogens prohibiting or 
criminalising violations of human rights, despite the seemingly inherent conflict between the 
two, and by those who claim that “immunity does not mean impunity”. See the discussion in 
part IV below and n.57. That debate, although at the forefront of many discussions about state 
immunity, is not the focus here. 
7
 Benkharbouche v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan [2015] EWCA Civ 33 and Belhaj v 
Straw [2014] EWCA Civ.  
1394.  
8
 The United States of America (Appellant) v Nolan (Respondent) [2015] UKSC 63 [2015] 3 
WLR 1105 Para 2. The original Employment Tribunal found the US to be in breach of the 
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The decision to close the Base was a sovereign public act of the US taken in respect 
of a military facility in the UK and would have attracted immunity if pleaded.9 The US had 
not pleaded immunity as it believed that the duty to consult under TULCRA s 188 did not 
apply to the decision to close the base as opposed to later in the process of closure. This view 
turned out to be controversial and potentially wrong when, a year after Mrs. Nolan had 
instituted proceedings, an Employment Appeal Tribunal in a different matter came to a wider 
interpretation of the duty to consult.10 By then it was too late for the US to plead state 
immunity as it had already submitted to the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal.11 It was 
duly found in breach of the Regulations and ordered to pay Mrs Nolan a month’s wages.12 
Undaunted, the US argued before the Court of Appeal  and the Supreme Court that it was not 
liable on the basis that the underlying duty had to be interpreted to exclude decisions made 
outside the UK for sovereign purposes (acta jure imperii).13 
The proceedings did not take a “straightforward course” 14, and before getting to the 
Supreme Court had involved a referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the 
Court of Justice”) (that resulted in an unhelpful decision that did not answer the question 
posed), a decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal and two Court of Appeal decisions 
which found against the US.15  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
relevant provisions on redundancy consultations. The Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld 
the order [2009] IRLR 923. The matter was considered by two UK Courts of Appeal and the 
European Court of Justice before going before the Supreme Court. 
9
 It was common ground that the US could have successfully pleaded state immunity when 
Mrs. Nolan first issued her complaint but had not done so. The Supreme Court found that it 
was immaterial whether the immunity would have arisen under the State Immunity Act 1978 
or at common law. Lord Mance, assuming s 16(2) of the State Immunity Act applied (which 
provides that a state’s immunity in respect of activities of its armed forces in the UK is to be 
decided at common law) held that there would have been immunity at common law following 
Holland v Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 1 WLR 1573, 1583D-F [2000] 3 All ER 833, 846-7.This 
case involved a libel claim brought by an instructor at a US military base arising out 
complaints about her teaching set out in  a memorandum sent by an education services 
officer. The court upheld the claim to immunity and applied Littrell v. United States of 
America (No. 2) [1995] 1 W.L.R. 82, [1994] 4 All E.R. 203 which concerned the provision of 
medical services on a US armed forces base in England and held that the plaintiff could not 
bring an action for personal injuries against the US Government as it was immune from suit. 
10
 UK Coal Mining Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers (Northumberland Area) [2008] ICR 
163. 
11
 UK State Immunity Act s 2. 
12
 [2009] IRLR 923. 
13
 At common law and under the UK State Immunity Act 1978 a state will generally be 
immune in respect of its sovereign acts- (acta jure imperii) but not its commercial acts (acta 
jure gestiones). 
14
 Nolan, (n. 1) para 8. 
15
 See n.9 above. The Supreme Court appeal was from [2014] EWCA Civ 71. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal case is US v Nolan [2009] IRLR 923. The related Court of 
Appeal case is US v Nolan [2010] EWCA Civ 1223. The Court of Justice (part of the Court 
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The EU dimension arose because Part IV Chapter II of TULCRA is intended to give 
effect to the UK’s duty to implement a European Directive on collective redundancy 
consultation.16  The UK statute, as originally drafted, had failed fully to do so, and the 
Regulations amended s188 of the statute to comply with the Directive in requiring that, in 
non-unionised enterprises, consultation take place with employee representatives. The EU 
Directive however expressly excluded workers employed by public administrative bodies 
which would have given the US the exception they claimed. The UK Regulations, while in 
some respects going further than the Directive, do not exclude public administrative bodies17 
hence the argument that they bound the US in respect of redundancies of civilian employees 
at the Base, a public administrative body.  
The Court of Justice was asked to interpret the UK Regulations in light of the EU 
Directive and conflicting English and EU authority18 but declined to decide the timing 
question on the basis it did not have jurisdiction. It found that EU law did not require or 
intend a foreign state to be subject to the consultative obligations because national defence, 
being an exercise of public power, was in principle not an economic activity subject to 
regulation of the internal market (the role of EU law).19 Having thus decided that the 
application of the EU Directive to foreign states was an excluded matter, the court declined to 
rule on the interpretation of the relevant duty to consult, as EU law does not require a uniform 
interpretation of excluded matters.20  
The UK Court of Appeal, to which the matter returned after the unsuccessful 
reference to Europe, declined to accept the US argument that since EU law did not require the 
Directive to apply to a foreign state neither should UK law. The timing issue was not 
addressed in these proceedings and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal on the 
condition that the US pay costs including those of any advocate appointed to the court. Mrs 
Nolan did not appear and was not represented (as had been the case in the second Court of 
Appeal hearing.)21 
III. The findings 
A. The international law interpretation argument 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of Justice of the European Union charged with interpreting EU legislation) decision is US v 
Nolan (C-583/10) [2013] 1 CMLR 32.  
16
 EU Council Directive 98/59/EC and its predecessor Council Directive 77/187/EEC. 
17TULCRA itself explicitly excludes UK armed forces, Crown employees and the police. See 
Nolan (n.1), paras 4-8. 
18UK Coal Mining Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers (Northumberland Area) (2008) ILR 
4; Akavan Erityisalojen Keskuslitto AEK ry v Fujitsu Siemens Computers Oy (C-44/08) 
[2010] 1 CMLR 11. 
19
 US v Nolan (C-583/10) [2013] I CMLR 32; US v Nolan [2010] EWCA Civ 1223; US v 
Nolan [2014] EWCA Civ 71. 
20
 US v Nolan (C-583/10) [2013] I CMLR 32. 
21
 US v Nolan [2014] EWCA Civ 71. Permission to appeal was given on 8 September 2014 
by Lords Mance, Sumption and Carnwath.  
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The doctrine of state immunity is justified on the basis of the sovereign equality and 
independence of states. A state will generally no longer be immune from the jurisdiction of 
another state’s courts in respect of its private commercial activities but remains immune in 
relation to its sovereign activities. The distinction is sometimes expressed as one between acts 
jure imperii (of a sovereign nature) and acts jure gestionis (of a commercial nature) with 
immunity from suit being removed from acts jure gestionis.22  
While the application of this test can be problematic, in Nolan it was common ground 
that a decision to close a military establishment was an act jure imperii which would have 
attracted state immunity if the US had raised this plea at the initial Employment Tribunal 
hearing.23 The focus instead was on whether there was a binding international law principle 
to the effect that UK legislation had to be interpreted to exclude its application to jure imperii 
activities of foreign states.  Sir Daniel Bethlehem KCMG QC (the ex-UK principal Legal 
Adviser of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office now back in private practice) for the 
US argued that settled international law principles of territorial jurisdiction justified such an 
exclusion. If a state were to legislate extra-territorially, that legislation had to be interpreted 
to exclude its application to the sovereign acts of a foreign state taking place outside its 
territory. He further argued that to deny such an exemption to the US would be 
discriminatory as the legislation clearly excluded the UK’s Crown employees from its 
ambit.24 
Lord Mance considered first the general principles of public international law on 
jurisdiction. His judgment relies on long extracts from the Permanent Court of International 
Justice decision in the Lotus case25 and from a standard international law textbook.26 Given 
the presumption of the legality of a state’s prescriptive jurisdiction (clear from Lotus) and, 
given that TULCRA applied to procedures for dismissal affecting employees working in the 
UK, the fact the decision was taken in Washington did not mean the UK was “legislating 
extra- territorially”. As Lord Mance pointed out, that is what immunity is for. The right to 
legislate exists as a matter of public international law but if the acts of a foreign sovereign 
acting in a sovereign capacity (jure imperii) are caught by the legislation, the state’s dignity is 
preserved by the immunity plea which bars the domestic action from proceeding. 27 Lord 
Mance did not consider it helpful to rely on the principle deriving from the US Supreme 
                                                          
22
 Sir Michael Wood, “Immunity from Jurisdiction and Immunity from Measures of 
Constraint”, in Roger O’Keefe and Christian Tams, The United Nations Convention on the 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Properties, A Commentary (OUP 2013), p.14; 
Rosalyn Higgins, “Equality of States and Immunity from Suit: A Complex Relationship” 
(2012) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 43 and Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State, ICJ Reports (2012) 99 para 57; see also the sources cited in n.5 above. 
23
 Nolan, (n. 1) para 3.  
24
 Ibid., paras 27-28. 
25
 The Case of the SS Lotus France v Turkey (1927) PCIJ Series A-No 10, pp 18-19. 
26
 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 8th Ed (2012) (OUP), 
Nolan (n.1) para 30. 
27
 Ibid., para 30. 
7 
 
Court decision in Hoffmann-la-Roche v Empagran SA and its discussion of the Charming 
Betsy principle that legislation needs to be interpreted consistently with international law.28  
In his view, there was no lack of clarity in the drafting of TULCRA (unlike in the relevant 
statute in Hoffmann la Roche) and the exclusion claimed by the US in Nolan for its decisions 
admittedly jure imperii taken abroad but affecting employees in the UK went too far.29 
Lord Mance secondly found that the suggested “tailored” exception “would make 
quite largely otiose the rules on claiming state immunity”.30 The US met this argument by 
emphasising that its case was not about immunity but about the substantive application of the 
domestic remedy- the existence or application to the US of the relevant rule.31 Lord Mance 
rejected this proposition as overly broad and suggested that it risked making “redundant a 
plea of state immunity at least in respect of any statutory claim”.32  
 Lord Mance finally rejected the argument that  to apply the consultation requirement 
to foreign states but not to the Crown was discrimination in breach of an alleged international 
law principle against discrimination between states. The US argued that non-discrimination is 
a general principle of international law relying in part on the English Court of Appeal 
decision in Benkharbouche v Sudan (discussed in part IV below).33 The Court rejected this, in 
part, as the alleged principle applied in Benkharbouche was based on human rights 
conventions on non-discrimination (such as the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) which benefit human beings not states.34 Lord 
Mance relied on Oppenheimer’s International Law 9th ed (1992) to the effect that …” there is 
in customary international law no clearly established general obligation on a state not to 
differentiate between other states in the treatment it accords to them…”35 
B. the European Union law interpretation argument: non-discrimination 
The US argued that under EU law UK courts had to extend to member states exemptions 
from TULCRA equivalent to those afforded to Crown employees. The US also argued that 
the EU rules on non-discrimination should apply to it horizontally even though it is neither a 
European citizen nor a member state, invoking cases on age discrimination.36 The Supreme 
                                                          
28Ibid., paras 32-34. Hoffmann-la-Roche v Empagran SA (2004) (542 US 155). Murray v 
Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804) is authority for the rule that US 
legislation ought never to be interpreted to “violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains.” 
29
 Nolan, (n.1) paras 35-36. 
30
 Ibid., para 36. 
31
 Ibid., para 38. 
32
 Ibid.,  
33
 Benkharbouche v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan [2015] EWCA Civ 33.  
34
 Nolan, (n. 1) para 40.  
35
 Ibid., para 41. 
36
 Nolan, (n.1) para 39. Court of Justice cases discussed included Mangold v Helm Case (C-
144/04) [2010] All ER (EC) 383 and Kucukdeveci v Swedex Gmbh & Co KG (Case C-
555/07) [2010] All ER  (EC) 867. See the discussion in Andrew Sanger, “State Immunity and 
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Court decided to leave both these issues open, in part because the Court of Justice, in 
declining jurisdiction in this case, had found non-member states to be specifically outside any 
protection under the relevant treaties in any event. In addition, Lord Mance was clear that 
non-member states were outside the protection of the relevant Human Rights conventions on 
the basis that there is no principle against discrimination against third party nationals. None 
of this is controversial as Lord Mance pointed out in making the comparison with a member 
state’s ability to discriminate in respect of tuition fees charged to non EU citizens.37 
C. The ultra vires argument 
The US’s last argument was that, in legislating for consultation to be required of public 
administrative bodies in the Regulations, the UK had gone further than the EU Directive 
(which excluded public administrative bodies) required. The Regulations were thus ultra 
vires under the European Communities Act 1972 s 2 which enables the UK to legislate by 
delegated legislation to give effect to EU law.38 If the UK legislation was ultra vires it could 
not bite against the US. 
The majority rejected the vires argument on the basis that, as the original scheme 
under TULCRA (an Act of Parliament which predated the Directive) had been wider than EU 
law later required (in applying to US military bases), later UK regulations amending the 
scheme would not be ultra vires in applying to the wider scheme. The court considered case 
law on the point and was clear that, where a directive applied to internal market situations 
only, s 2(2) of the 1972 Act did not permit extensions to non-domestic situations by delegated 
legislation. Where the original instrument was an Act of Parliament which extended to non-
domestic situations however, the instrument could be supplemented by delegated legislation –
here in the form of the UK Regulations and any extension would apply to the wider 
catchment.39 
Lord Carnwath dissented on the vires point finding that the extension of the 
Regulations to public administrative bodies by secondary legislation, such as the US military 
facility, was not within the power conferred by the 1972 European Communities Act and 
were therefore ultra vires, as Parliament itself had not legislated.40 
IV. Analysis and Commentary 
The Supreme Court’s decision in US v Nolan in finding that a plea of immunity is procedural 
which, unless successfully pleaded, does not deny the domestic court jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the alleged dispute is significant for international law but where it leaves the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the Right of Access to a Court under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights” (2016) ICLQ 
213-228 at p.215.  
37
  Nolan, (n.1), para 46. 
38
 Ibid., para 48. 
39
 Ibid., para 72. 
40
 Ibid., para 100.  
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debate about the relationship between the international law rules and domestic rules on 
immunity, jurisdiction and access to justice is still problematic.  
Lord Mance accepted the argument that immunity is a procedural plea. In doing so he 
relied on the influential book on state immunity written by Hazel Fox CMG QC and Philippa 
Webb.41 They argue forcibly that state immunity as a procedural plea does not as such affect 
a state’s jurisdiction. This approach was favoured by the International Court of Justice in 
2012 in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy).42  
If it is accepted that immunity is a procedural plea distinct from the underlying 
primary obligation of the foreign state then, as Lord Mance concluded, the US argument  that 
there is some exemption from underlying liability for acts jure imperii cannot have any 
merit43. It is one thing to accept that immunity, although it can have the effect of denying a 
remedy to a claimant, is necessary to preserve a state’s sovereign dignity. It is quite another 
to argue that the UK is not capable of legislating for acts in the UK affecting employees of a 
foreign state employed in the UK. As Lord Mance put it: 
…carried to its logical conclusion it would mean that all legislation should, however 
clear in scope, be read as inapplicable to a foreign state in any case where the state 
could plead State Immunity. That would elide two distinct principles, and, as noted 
already, very largely make redundant a plea of State Immunity at least in respect of 
any statutory claim. 44 
The distinction between a procedural plea of immunity and the underlying obligation 
or duty (and the debate about the jurisprudential nature of state immunity which goes with it) 
is also material to the discussion about whether or not immunity is a denial of a claimant’s 
human right of access to justice. In the European context this is usually put in terms of 
whether immunity is a breach of a claimant’s rights under Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights has always maintained 
that the making of a plea of immunity itself requires a consideration of Article 6 (the article is 
per se engaged) but, as the right is a relative one, immunity may not be a denial of access if 
the extent of the immunity is legitimate and proportionate. The Strasbourg court has held that 
Article 6 not only guarantees fair trial rights once proceedings have been instituted but also a 
right to institute proceedings to begin with.45 It has also so far found that the UK courts’ 
acceptance of a plea of immunity in a given case has been consistent with the court’s view of 
customary international law and thus proportionate.46   
                                                          
41
 Ibid., para 36 and Fox and Webb, (n.5) p 20.  
42
 ICJ Reports (2012) 99 para 57.  
43
 Nolan, (n.1) para 36. 
44
 Ibid.,para 38. 
45
 Golder v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 524. 
46
 Jones v UK (2014) 59 EHRR 1; Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (2001) 123 ILR 24; 
McElhinney v. Ireland and United Kingdom (2002) EHRR 13 and Fogarty v UK (2001) 123c 
ILR 53. Other cases include Kalogeropoulou v Greece (2002) 129 ILR 537; Sabeh El Leil v 
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The Strasbourg court’s approach is to be contrasted with the findings of English 
courts to the effect that, as immunity deprives a court of jurisdiction in a given case, a plea of 
immunity cannot give rise to a claim under Article 6 as this requires the existence of an 
underlying jurisdiction.47 As Lord Bingham put it in Jones v Saudi Arabia “a state cannot be 
said to deny access to its court if it had no access to give.”48  
The potential disjuncture between this approach and that of Lord Mance and the 
Supreme Court in Nolan may have resonance when the Supreme Court hears the appeal in the 
case of Benkharbouche v Sudan. The Court of Appeal, in a case about the employment rights 
of domestic staff of foreign embassies in London, decided that the UK State Immunity Act 
1978 ss 16 (1) (a) and s 4 (2) (b) were incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR as going 
beyond the international customary law requirement of immunity in employment cases. The 
immunity afforded to Sudan under s 4 of the SIA was, in other words, not proportionate or 
legitimate. 49 The Court of Appeal did not actually decide whether Article 6 was engaged by a 
mere plea of immunity however, and stated that it was bound by the approach of Lord Millett 
in Holland v Lampen Wolfe to the effect that the article was not so engaged.50  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
France (2012) 54 EHRR 14; Cudak v. Lithuania  (2010) 51 EHRR 15 and Oleynikov v. 
Russia (2013) 57 EHRR 15. 
47
 Holland v Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 1 WLR 1573; and Jones v Ministry of Interior of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26 [2007] 1 A.C. 270.  
48
 Jones v Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , [2006] UKHL 26 [2007] 1 
A.C. 270 p. 280, 289 and 293 (per Lord Bingham). See also articles cited at n.5 and n.22 
above. The UK Supreme Court Judge, Lord Sumption makes this point writing extra-
judicially in giving the James Wood Lecture at the University of Glasgow  “The right to a 
court: Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention”. Page 18 available at 
http://schooloflaw.academicblogs.co.uk/2015/10/13/james-wood-memorial-lecture-the-rt-
hon-lord-sumption/  (accessed 17 March 2016) Lord Sumption distinguishes the meaning of 
‘procedural’ in stating that the plea of immunity is “not procedural in the sense that the 
organisation and practices of the court system are procedural” p 18 where he is expressing 
concern at the width of some Article 6 decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. 
49
 Benkharbouche, (n.33), para 53 and 66. The case is largely about EU law and is the first 
case to consider the effect of the recent EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which contains a 
right of access identical to that of Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  As Andrew Sanger has pointed out, Lord Justice Dyson in Benkharbouche  followed 
the English approach of finding that a plea of immunity does not engage Article 6 –the right 
of access to the court- following Lord Millett. The Court of Appeal refused to interpret the 
SIA to comply with what it had found was inconsistent customary law –the declaration of 
incompatibility did not affect the validity of the SIA merely operated as a signal to 
Parliament that it needs to consider amending the legislation.” A.S. Garnett “State and 
Diplomatic Immunity and Employment Rights: European Law to the Rescue?” (2015) 64 (4) 
ICLQ 783, 816 and note 129. 
50
 Benkharbouche, (n.33), para 16.  
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In Benkarbouche the Court of Appeal was not convinced that where sovereign immunity 
applied there was room for recourse to Article 6.  It is helpful to quote from the judgment in 
extenso: 
It is difficult to see how Article 6 can be engaged if international law denies to the 
Contracting State jurisdiction over a dispute. There can be no denial of justice for 
which the State is responsible if there is, as a matter of international law, no court 
capable of exercising jurisdiction. Moreover, Article 6 cannot have been intended to 
confer on Contracting States a jurisdiction which they would not otherwise possess, 
nor could it have conferred a jurisdiction denied by general international law in such a 
way as to be binding on non-Contracting States. It is unfortunate that in none of its 
many decisions in which the point has arisen has the Strasbourg court grappled with 
these considerations. (The statement of the court in the Fogarty case 34 EHRR 302 , 
para 26, that the grant of immunity does not qualify a substantive right but is a 
procedural bar on the national courts' power to determine the right, while correct as a 
matter of domestic law, does not meet the point. See also Jones v United Kingdom, 
para 164.) However, we consider that in the present case it is not necessary for us to 
choose between these competing approaches. The approach of the Strasbourg court 
would not result in a contracting state being held to be in breach of article 6 simply 
because it gave effect to a rule of international law requiring the grant of immunity. In 
any such case the grant of immunity would be held to be a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim. Under the Strasbourg jurisprudence, any debate as to what 
are the applicable rules of international law is transferred to a later stage of the 
analysis and addressed in the context of article 6. 51 
Whether or not a plea of immunity engages Article 6 of the ECHR did not matter to 
the Court of Appeal’s decision in Benkarbouche. It did not matter because the court itself 
decided that the relevant provisions of the UK SIA were out of line with international law 
and, given the EU context, could be declared incompatible.52 
The issue may arise beyond the European context however which is why Nolan is 
significant. Does a domestic court have jurisdiction or not when a state raises a plea of 
immunity? Lord Mance in Nolan seems to be saying it does and that immunity merely 
operates as a procedural bar which mirrors the Strasbourg court’s approach. The court in 
other words is looking at immunity as a threshold issue. There are no doubt many meanings 
to the words “procedural” and “substantive” in this context and the answer may lie in the 
approach of Article 6 (1) of the UN Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunity of States and 
Their Property 2004 which provides that “a State shall give effect to State immunity …. by 
refraining from exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding before its courts against another 
                                                          
51Ibid., para 16.  
52
 Ibid., para 53. 
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State.”53 This suggests there is jurisdiction but the court has to exercise restraint. This would 
be consistent with the fact that a state can waive immunity in advance or by submitting to the 
jurisdiction--and once waived immunity cannot be revived--despite the US arguments in 
Nolan.54 
The debate is also very relevant to whether there may be a need for Parliament to 
amend the UK SIA to take account of changes to customary law rules on immunity, 
particularly in the employment context. One might also ask whether the view (accepted by 
the Supreme Court and both parties) that the US would have been entitled to immunity had 
she pleaded it in Nolan, can survive the attack on state immunity in relation to claims by 
employees of diplomatic missions (the subject matter in Benkharbouche). Is there in other 
words a real difference between an embassy and a military establishment such as the one in 
Nolan?55  
The approach of treating immunity as a procedural plea is also important to the 
argument that immunity can exist alongside international rules prohibiting or criminalising 
violations of human rights, despite the seemingly inherent conflict between the two. This 
view is used to refute the suggestion that human rights norms as jus cogens norms in some 
way trump immunity which must as a result therefore be denied to the defendant state. It is 
the premise behind the statement “immunity does not mean impunity”.56 As stated by Judges 
Higgins, Kooijimans and Buergenthal in their Joint Separate Opinion in the ICJ Arrest 
                                                          
53
 The Convention is not in force but persuasive and much is customary. See in Roger 
O’Keefe and Christian Tams, The United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and their Properties, A Commentary (OUP 2013). See discussion on 
restraint in Sanger, (n.5), page 220.  
54
 In High Commissioner for Pakistan in the United Kingdom v National Westminster Bank 
[2015] EWHC Mr Justice Henderson set aside a notice of discontinuance he found Pakistan 
to have issued to preserve its state immunity after it had instituted proceedings- thereby 
waiving immunity. Pakistan’s attempt was an abuse of the court- once immunity was waived 
it could not be revived. Another approach might be to discuss immunity as a threshold matter. 
 
55
 S. 16(2)  of the SIA provides that the statute does not apply to foreign military 
establishments in the UK and S. 16(1)(a) states that embassy staff are not to benefit from the 
restrictive immunity in S. 4 (instead the absolute immunity conferred by the Diplomatic 
Privileges Act 1964 applies).  
56
 L. McGregor “Torture and state immunity: deflecting impunity, distorting sovereignty”, 
2007 18(5) EJIL 903-919;L. McGregor ‘Questioning the Impact of the UN Convention on 
State Immunity on the Evolving Relationship between State Immunity and Jus Cogens Norms 
Under International Law (2006) 55 ICLQ 437-45; Roger O’Keefe and Christian Tams, The 
United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Properties, A 
Commentary, (OUP 2013) ;  Xiadong Yang, State Immunity in International Law, (CUP 
2012); Hersch Lauterpacht, “The problem of jurisdictional immunities of foreign States” 3 
Collected Papers 315 (1951). 
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Warant Case 57 and by the ICJ in the Jurisdictional Immunities case, immunity as a 
procedural plea in a domestic court can co-exist with substantive liability in both domestic 
and international law.58This is not the place to discuss issues of trumping and jus cogens as 
the focus here has been on employment rights not grave breaches of fundamental norms.  
As explained in the introduction, the point being made here is that the procedural 
approach as stated in Nolan has been espoused by those who argue that access to justice  may 
be compromised by a plea of immunity, in other words that immunity may itself be a denial 
of justice. This is particularly so in Europe where the right of access to justice  is protected by 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This is not however the position 
taken in English law to date and where this leaves the debate about the relationship between 
the international law rules on immunity, domestic rules on immunity, jurisdiction and access 
to justice is therefore open to question.  
V. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court in US v Nolan found against the state on all its grounds of appeal. The 
findings on the application of EU law and on ultra vires have been explained in outline only 
here. The US argument that UK primary and secondary legislation (in this case TULCRA and 
the Regulations) had to be read subject to a pervasive exclusion in respect of the sovereign 
acts of a foreign state was firmly rejected by the court as being in effect a justification for a 
second bite at the cherry of immunity. There was nothing very surprising about this but it is 
interesting that the decision depended in part on Lord Mance’s acceptance of the concept of 
immunity as a procedural plea whose effect is not to deny the court jurisdiction in the first 
place. This approach has an impact on the discussion about whether or not Article 6 of the 
ECHR (access to justice) is engaged by an immunity plea and may be inconsistent with the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Benkarbouche and earlier House of Lords authority.  
This is not the place to settle these questions. It will be for the Supreme Court when 
the Benkhabouche appeal is heard to analyse the impact if any of the approach taken by the 
court in US v Nolan. 
                                                          
57
 Arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) [2002] ICJ 
Rep 3, Joint Separate Opinion para 71. 
58
 ICJ Reports (2012) 99 paras 55-57.   
